A REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES by unknown
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice
Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 8
Spring 4-1-1998
A REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice at Washington & Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an
authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
A REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES, 4 Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J. 54 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol4/iss1/8
A REVIEW OF HIGHER EDUCATION AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Both federal and state governments have enacted
numerous minority assistance programs that are accom-
plished through the use of affirmative action.' Through
affirmative action programs remedies are sought to ame-
liorate the harsh effects of slavery and new social, political,
and economic opportunities are provided for minorities.
Many colleges and universities s ecifically, have
implemented affirmative action policies not only to rem-
edy past discrimination, but also to achieve a racially and
ethnically diverse student body. The quest for diversity
in the arena of higher education has given rise to con-
siderable controversy.5 The courts have been faced with
the difficult task of balancing the proper use of race and
the benefits and opportunities afforded to disadvantaged
students, with the negative impact these programs are
sometimes proposed to have on non-minority students.6
The Civil Rights Act of 19647 spurred the movement
in schools of higher education to adopt special admis-
sions policies in order to achieve a student body diverse
in race and ethnicity. Such policies generally tend to per-
mit admissions committees to consider candidates based
on criteria beyond the traditional objective admission
criteria of grades and standardized test scores to consid-
er race, gender, and ethnicity as part of the decision
process.8 These admissions policies have been and con-
tinue to be extremely controversial as the public evalu-
ates race based preference policies.9
The Supreme Court was faced with its first affirma-
tive action case in Defunis v. Odegaardl° more than
See, e.g., Howard Fineman, Affirmative Action, Race and
Rage:When Preferences Work -And Don't, Newsweek,April 3,
1995, at 22, 24.
See, e.g., Martin Michaelson, Building a Comprehensive
Defense of Affirmative Action Programs, Chronology of Higher
Education.,July 28, 1995.
3Colleges and Universities have employed many different
menthods of affirmative action including race- conscious finan-
cial aid and the recognition of race as a factor for admission.
4See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 861 E Supp. 551, 569-573
(W.D.Tex. 1994).
5See, e.g., Alexander W Austin, What Matters in College?:
Four Critical Years Revisited 429 (1993).
6See, e.g., 34 William and Mary Law Review 33,34 (1992).
7Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S.C. §2000d (1989).
See, e.g., Stephanie Wildman, Integration in the 1980's:The
Dream of Diversity in the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 Tulane Law
Review, 1625 (1990).
See, e.g., Howard Fineman, Affirmative Action, Race and
Rage: When Preferences Work- And Don't, Newsweek,April 3,
1995.
10Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
twenty years ago. However, a majority decision as to the
standard of review by which affirmative action programs
were to be assessed was not handed down until 1989 in
City of Richmond v. Croson Co., fifteen years later.I
Eventually, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for
affirmative action programs in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena. " The Court stated that "[a] ll racial classifica-
tions, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local gov-
erdmental actor, must be analyzed under strict scruti-
ny." 13 Because the many private colleges and universities
that receive federal funding are regulated by Title VI, 4
and state colleges and universities are regulated as state
actors by the 14th Amendment, 5 these institutions are
subject to constitutional limitations in enacting race-
conscious classifications.1
6
Recently, two federal courts have struck down race-
based preference programs at institutions of higher
learning.' 7 The Supreme Court has articulated the consti-
tutional criteria that race-based preference grograms
must meet under the Equal Protection Clause, but has
failed to approve a diversity admissions policy.
Specifically, the Supreme Court in 1996 denied certiorari
to hear a race based preference program in higher edu-
cation case.19 The emphasis of this paper is on the effect
of these Supreme Court and lower court decisions on
affirmative action or race based preference programs,
while also considering whether or not it is now possible
for schools of higher education to pass the strict scruti-
ny muster and rigid standards set out in recent Supreme
Court decisions.
ICity of Richmond v. Croson 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989).
(holding that strict scrutiny was the applicable standard of
review under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment for race- based programs.)
" Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097
(1995).
'3115 S.Ct at 2113 (1995).
" Title VI prohibits recipients of federal funding from dis-
criminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin. 42
U.S.C. § 2000 (d) (1988).
'"The Court has interpreted Title VI to allow affirmative
action programs that use racial and ethnic classifications if
those classifications are permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause See. Regents of the University of the University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,287 (1978).
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 287 (1978).
17See Podbersky v. Kirwan, 38 E3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994)
Hopwood v. Texas, 21 E 3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994).
See Adarand Constuctors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097
(1995).
'9Texas v. Hopwood, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996).
When examining the issue of affirmative action in
relation to higher education, it is helpful to examine the
early decisions in this area. Many of these early cases
have helped shape the law, while also leading the
Supreme Court on a scavenger hunt to determine their
proper application to affirmative action. Thus, this paper
will examine not only recent court decisions in the area
of affirmative action, but also the cases that were and are
fundamental in determining how affirmative action
relates to colleges and universities today. Consideration
will also be given to whether affirmative action as we
know is still possible under the recent Supreme Court
decisions.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Pre- Affirmative Action: The Racial Segregation
of Public Schools
The 14th Amendment was adopted in 1868 to pro-
vide freedom and equal treatment by prohibiting state-
sponsored discrimination against emancipated slaves. 2°
Although the text of the 14th Amendment provides that
"[n]o state shall deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws,' emancipated slaves continued to confront
racial discrimination and racism long after the passage of
the 14th Amendment.2 1 The Supreme Court's decision in
22Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights
Movement, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,23
and affirmative action programs have sought to remedy
this past discrimination and encourage diversity in the
work force as well as in the arena of higher education.1
4
The first uses of race-conscious action, similar to race-
based preference policies, by the courts as an attempt to
aid African-Americans were remedial in nature and
intended to remedy the unequal or disparate treatment
of African-Americans. Race conscious actions were
upheld in two settings in particular; school desegrega-
tion and employment. 
2
In Brown v. Board of Education the Court invoked
the 14th Amendment to strike down laws in Delaware,
Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia that required or
20See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265,293 (1978).
21
See William Gillette, Retreat From Reconstruction, 379
(1979).
Brown v. Board of Eduaction, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
24See Rhonda McMillion ,Affirmative Action Struggle,A.B.A.
Journal, Jan. 1995 at 90.
25See Gerald D. Jaynes, A Common Destiny; Blacks and
American Society (1989).
26Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Z7347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id.
allowed racial segregation in the public schools. Brown
2 7
has been highly regarded for many reasons one of which
is that Brown was one of the first cases to apply strict
scrutiny to a race based classification,"' as is similarly
29
applied today in affirmative action cases.
Although the Court in Brown3 was asked to overrule31
the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, it
did not. Instead, the Court applied the "separate but equal"
doctrine, and determined that "[sleparate educational
3 2facilities are inherently unequal" The Court concluded
that," [T]he Negro and white schools involved have been
equalized with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifica-
tions and salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible fac-
tors '. However, the education that was provided in the
segregated schools was inherently unequal to that offered
in integrated setting due to the negative psychological
effect that the forced segregation had on the black school
children.34 "To separate them from the others of similar
age and qualifications because of the their race generates
a feeling of inferiority, as to their status in the community,
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to
ever be undone" 35 The Court ultimately concluded that,
"[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate, 36
but equal' has no place." African-American children were
to be given the equivalent educational opportunities avail-
able to other non-minority public school children.37
A similar case, Boiling v. Sharpe 8 was decided the
same day as Brown.3 9 In this case the Court held that the
5th Amendment also barred the federal government from
segregating schools in the District of Columbia.This sep-
aration constituted "[a]n arbitrary deprivation of liberty
in violation of the Due Process Clause."40
As a result of the Brown decision the Supreme Court
eventually insisted that school boards take steps to insure
that the patterns of segregation present in the schools be
abolished. Often these steps were of necessity race-con-
scious. Sometimes, the only way to break up the pattern
of segregation was for the courts to order school boards
to enroll a certain number of African- American children
4'
in formerly white schools. This ultimately led to race
conscious busing in which students were bused out of
their school districts in order to achieve a suitable bal-
2Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
'°Id. at 483.






3Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
39347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'Id at 500 (1954).
4lBrown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294,298 (1955).
42See Green v. County School Board 391 U.S 430 (1968).
ance of race. One could hypothesize that the court was
promoting the same type of "diversity" through the meth-
ods of busing and setting quotas for white schools, that
we see many proponents of affirmative action advocating
today through race-conscious admissions policies.
After the decision in Brown43 the Court held that racial
segregation of public facilities was unconstitutional. Today
the Equal Protection clause prohibits the government from
mandating racial segregation of any public facilities.
These court opinions of early public school desegre-
gation cases provided much needed answers and reme-
dies to the issues that were applicable at the time of the
court proceedings. However, many of the questions of
disparate treatment among whites and minorities in edu-
cation still remain at hand. With higher education becom-
ing commonplace in the homes of many whites and
minorities, we are faced with an exceedingly vast array of
questions that the Court in Brown never considered.The
issues resolved in the early school desegregation cases
merely touch the tip of the iceberg of affirmative action,
and leave many undecided issues for the courts.
B. University of California v. Bakke
Although the Supreme Court has established standards
of review for Equal Protection Clause challenges, the Court
has struggled with the application of these standards to
affirmative action. The Supreme Court first addressed the
appropriate standard of review to be applied in this con-
44
text in University of California Regents v. Bakke.
In this case, the Court examined the Medical School
of the University of California at Davis's special admission
program that established 4quotas based on the race and
ethnicity of the applicant. The purpose of the program
was to achieve a racially diverse student body.46 Although
there was no prior discrimination or court order requir-
ing an affirmative action program, Davis created a sepa-
rate admissions standard for "economically and or educa-
tionally disadvantaged" applicants and for minority
groups. Those that applied and met the qualifications for
this special admissions program were evaluated by a
lower standard of review than the regular applicants.
Allan Bakke, a white male, was twice denied admission
to the University of California at Davis Medical School
despite the fact that his grades and Medical College
43349 U.S. 298 (1955).
4University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).










AdmissionTest (MCAT) scores were much higher than those
of some minorityapplicants who were admitted under the
special program. In response to his second denial, Bakke
challenged Davis's affirmative action policy on the grounds
that the program violated his constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws and the statutory prohibition against
racial discrimination in federally funded programs.
Splitting four justices in favor of the program and four
justices against, Justice Powell announced the plurality
opinion of the Court that the Davis Medical School admis-
sion policy must be considered under the "strictest scruti-
ny" since it provided a quota for minority applicants.
Justice Powell further stated that preferential treatment
solely based on membership in a racial roup was dis-
crimination forbidden by the Constitution. Although the
state has a legitimate and substantial purpose in remedy-
ing past discrimination, there was no precedent for taking
such action without a prior judicial, legislative, or admin-
istrative finding of past unconstitutional discrimination."
Justice Powell left open the possibility that other
affirmative action programs, based on findings of past
racial discrimination which created a substantial interest
in exonerating the rights of those victims, could be con-
stitutional.54 However, he stated," [I]f petitioner's purpose
is to assure within its student body some specified per-
centage of a particular group merely because of its race
or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be
rejected not as insubstantial, but as facially invalid."55
Preferring members of one group for no other reason
than race or ethnic origin is discrimination which the
Constitution forbids. 6 This particular aspect of the
Bakke decision remains solidly rooted in 
the law.57
Justice Powell also rejected the argument that a pref-
erence was a legitimate remedy for past societal discrim-
ination.5 This holding has been embraced by subsequent
cases. Bakke recognized that an institution may only
act to remedy its own prior discrimination. 6°
Accordingly, Justice Powell approved of programs
where,"race or ethnicity can be deemed a plus in a par-
ticular applicants file, yet it does not insulate the individ-
ual from comparison with all other candidates for the
available seats." Thus, the Court found, "no facial infir-
mity in an admissions program were race or ethnic back-
ground is simply one element to be weighted fairly





57See City of Ricmond v. JA. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 496
(1989).
Id.




C. Fuilove v. Klutznick
The Supreme Court's next major task in the area of
affirmative action was Fullilove v. Klutznick.63 In this
case, the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) provision
of the Public Works Employment Act (PWEA) of 1977
was challenged.The MBE provision provided that, absent
administrative waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted
for local public works projects were to be used by the
state or local grantees to procure services or supplies
from businesses owned and controlled by members of64
statutorily defined minority groups. Grantees were
obliged to provide technical assistance for bonding, solic-
it federal aid for working capital, and guide minority con-65
tractors through the bidding process. The administra-
tive waiver provided that contractors that could not that
could not find a qualified MBE were released from this
66
requirement.
The Court examined the (PWEA) using a two prong
test assessing whether Congress had the power to enact
the legislation, and whether race and ethnicity were
constitutionally permissible conditions for achieving
67
Congress's objectives. The Court responded by giving
significant deference to Congress's remedial powers,"It
is fundamental that in no organ of government, state or
federal, does there repose a more comprehensive reme-
dial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by
the Constitution with the competence and the authority
to enforce equal protection guarantees."68
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion joined by
Justice White, and Justice Powell upheld the Act and
rejected the argument that this 10% minority require-
ment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment.69The Chief Justice reasoned that Congress's
legislative authority under Section Five of the 14th
Amendment provides sufficient protection for such a
program. The Court concluded that, "[A] great deal of
deference should be accorded to race-conscious mea-
sures taken by Congress, especially when Congress had
abundant evidence from which it could conclude that
minority businesses have been denied effective partici-
pation in public contracting opportunities by procure-
ment practices that perpetuated the effects of prior dis-
crimination.
7 1







7°Id at 483-484.71Id. at 477-478.
The Court further concluded that Congress's goal of
fostering equal opportunities for minority businesses to
obtain federal grants was within the scope of Congress's
spendingyower, the Commerce Clause, and the 14th
Amendment. Congress had legitimately enacted the
(PWEA) to give minority groups equitable footing with
respect to public contracting opportunities and not to
73
bestow a preference over other contractors.
The Court in Fulilove failed to explicitly adopt a
specific standard of review. However, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Powell averred that the Act at issue in
this case would have satisfied strict scrutiny. Chief Justice
Burger concluded, "[Riegardless of whether strict or
intermediate scrutiny applied to the program, the pro-
gram did not violate the United States Constitution."
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion was joined by
Justice Rehnquist and argued that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited "invidious discrimination" by both fed-
75
eral and state governments. Justice Stewart further stat-
ed that the Court's decision would have the negative
long term consequences of reinforcing a baseless stereo-
type that certain groups are unable to achieve success
76
without special government assistance. To prevent this
effect Justice Stewart reasoned the Court should adopt a
strict scrutiny, equal protection analysis for both federal
and state affirmative action and minority assistance pro-
77
grams. Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's hold-
ing possessing the opinion that there should be absolute
prohibitions on all statutory race classifications.
7 8
D. City of Richmond v. Croson
In 1989, the Supreme Court returned to the princi-
ples established in Fullilove with the case of City of
Richmond v.JA. Croson.79This case involved a state man-
dated set-aside program that was modeled after the fed-
eral program upheld in Fullilove.
The Court found that the local population was 50%
African American, while only .67% of the city's contracts
were awarded to minority business enterprises. In order
to counteract this situation, the city adopted a program
requiring non-minority owned prime contractors to sub-
contract a minimum of 30% of the dollar amount of each
city construction contract to one or more MBE's.





79City of Richmond v.JA. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
8°488 U.S. 469,478 (1989).
Richmond's plan also devised an administrative waiver in
the event that to MBE's were unavailable.8' Through this
legislation, city legislators intended to remedy past dis-
crimination that minority businesses had experienced in
the local construction industry. 
2
Petitioner, J.A. Croson was denied a waiver and sub-
sequently lost a city project when it failed to meet the
city's minority subcontractor requirements. Croson filed
suit alleging that Richmond's plan violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 83 The district court's decision uphold-
ing the program was reversed by the Fourth Circuit, and
the Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion for the
Court. The Court held that attempting to remedy the
effects of past discrimination, whether public or private,
constituted a compelling interest that could justify gov-
ernment racial classifications. The government could
remedy the effects of its own discrimination and the gov-
ernment could remedy the effects of private discrimina-
tion that occurred within its jurisdiction where the gov-
ernment was acting as a passive participant, and had
helped perpetuate that discrimination. 9 The Court ruled
however, that the programs could not be based upon
general societal discrimination. "[W]hile there is no
doubt that the sorry history of both public and private
discrimination in this country has contributed to the
lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this obser-
vation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota
in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond,86
Virginia." Richmond was required to specifically
describe the discrimination that it intended to rectify
through this affirmative action program.
In holding the plan to be unconstitutional Justice
O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices White and Kennedy in adopting strict scrutiny as
the standard of review for all racial classifications. 87
Justice Scalia agreed with the four justices that strict
scrutiny should be applied to all racial classifications,
although he declined to join O'Connor's opinion
because he did not believe that remedying the effects of
past discrimination could ever justify the government's
use of racial classification.8 The Court further applied
the two prong strict scrutiny test. In regard to the first
prong, "Absent clear evidence of existing discrimination,









remedying present effects of past discrimination is gen-
erally the only acceptable compelling interest for this
type of affirmative action program." 
9
The second prong of the test requires that in order
to be narrowly tailored the program must satisfy several
requirements: It must be of limited duration; it cannot
place undue burdens on third parties; it must be tied to
the relevant labor market; and there must not exist a fea-
sible race neutral alternative. The Court found that
Richmond failed all prongs of the test.9O
The Richmond program did not meet the strict
scrutiny test because the city failed to present evidence
to show that the government contractors were discrimi-
nating against minority businesses.9' The program also
constituted an inflexible and rigid numerical quota that
failed to disqualify minority applicants that had not been
victims of past discrimination. Finally, the program was
over-inclusive. Although the city claimed an intent to
remedy discrimination against African-Americans, the
ordinance also named members of other races as benefi-
ciaries of the program.9'
The Court distinguished this case from Fullilove" in
recognizing that Fullilove involved an enactment by a co-
equal branch of the federal government, Congress, while
Croson involved a local program. Thus Congress's find-
ing, that there existed historical discrimination in the
public works area was entitled to a degree of deference
greater than that due to Richmond." Justice O'Connor
stated,
"[T]hus, while generalized findings by
Congress of historical discrimination were suffi-
cient to justify their use of racial classifications
in remedial legislation, the city of Richmond was
required to particularize its findings of private
discrimination, essentially showing that it had
been a passive participant in a system of racial
exclusion practiced bz elements of the local
construction industry."
Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun adhered to
the same view that they had expressed in Bakke, "race
conscious classifications designed to further remedial
goals must serve governmental objectives and must be
"Id. at 498-506.
Id. at 508.9 1Id. at 504-506.
9"Id. at 508.
"Id. at 506.
94Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
"Id. 490- 492.
'Id. at 492.
substantially related to achievement of those objectives
97
in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny." Justice
Marshall believed that remedial racial classifications
should not be subjected to the Court's traditional strict
level of scrutiny which he characterized in Fullilove as,
"scrutiny that is strict in theory but fatal in fact."98
Applying their intermediate level of scrutiny, the dissent-
ing Justices believed that the statistical disparities and
the congressional findings of past nationwide discrimi-
nation, which were rejected by O'Connor, were suffi-
cient bases to justify the city of Richmond's remedial use
of racial classifications."
E. Metro Broadcasting v FCC
Only one year after its decision in Croson, the Court
revisited the issue of the standard of review to be
applied in evaluating remedial racial classifications in100
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC. This case involved a
congressionally mandated FCC program that sought to
increase minority representation in the broadcasting
industry. The program proposed to achieve increased
minority representation in two ways:The FCC pledged to
consider minority ownership as one factor in compara-
tive proceedings for new licenses; and The FCC decided
to allow broadcasters whose licenses had either been
designated for a revocation hearing or whose renewal
applications had been designated for a hearing, to assign
the license to an FCC approved minority enterprise.
The Plaintiff, Metro Broadcasting, lost a license to a
minority owned business and filed suit against the FCC
alleging that the congressionally-approved program was in
violation of the 14th Amendment. In a 5 to 4 decision, the
Court ruled the program constitutional after subjecting it
to a less stringent standard of review, intermediate scruti-102
ny. Intermediate scrutiny requires that congressional
race-conscious measures be substantially related to the
achievement of an important government objective.
The Court held that the preferences promoted an
interest in providing a diverse programming content, and
that the preferences were the only way to do this
because the First Amendment limits the government's
ability to control content directly.1°4 The program also
provided for administrative and judicial review of all
97 Id. at 535.
98 Id. at 552 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 519
(1980).
99 Id. at 541-548.
100 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
101 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
102 497 U.S. 498-506.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 569-584
Commission decisions and, according to the majority, did
not impose an undue burden on non-minorities.105
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan found it, "of
overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's
minority ownership programs have been specificall
approved - indeed, mandated by Congress."
Therefore, Brennan distinguished this case from Croson
by interpreting Croson as deeming proper standard of
review to be used when examining state and local affir-
mative action programs, not those created by Congress
to which the Court owes appropriate deference.
Through this narrow majority, the Supreme Court,
for the first time, upheld an affirmative action program
with a middle tier analysis based on reasons other than
remedying past racial discrimination. °8 The four dis-
senters argued that under a strict scrutiny review, the
programs would not comply with the established
Constitutional principles. Justice O'Connor argued
that the Courts holding in Fullilove stood only for the
proposition that Congress may enact measures that seek
to remedy identified past discrimination affecting a par-
ticular industry."° FinallyJustice O'Connor criticized the
majority's toleration and acceptance of benign racial
classifications as unwise, in light of historical evidence
that racial classifications must be viewed suspectly and
strictly scrutinized.
Although this case helped to clarify the Court's deci-
sions in Fullilove and Croson, the question of standard of
review still remained at issue. This unanswered question
set the stage for the Adarand. case.
III.The Turning Point of Affirmative Action- The
Adarand Decision.
In June, 1995, the Supreme Court extended the rig-
orous strict scrutiny standard of review to federal race
based preference programs in Adararand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena. In 1989, The Central Federal Lands
Highway Division, a part of the United States
Department of Transportation (D.O.T) awarded the
prime contract for a highway construction project in
Colorado to Mountain Gravel and Construction
Company. The contract was subject to the Surface
Transportation & Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
105 Id.
106 Id. at 563.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 603.
109 Id. at 602.
110 Id. at 607.
111 Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
112 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
1987 (STURAA), a federal appropriations measure. Under
STURAA, 10% of appropriated funds were targeted to be
expended with small business concerns owned and con-
trolled by socially and economically disadvantaged indi-
viduals, with certain racial groups and women being pre-
sumed to qualify as such.
The Small business Act provided that Subcontractor
Compensation Clauses (SCC's) were to be included in
most federal agency contracts in order to achieve target-
ed goals.
These SCC's award contractors an extra 10% of the
subcontract price if they hire one or more disadvantaged
business enterprises (DBE's) as subcontractors.
As the D.O.T policy required, Mountain Gravel's con-
tract provided that as prime contractor, it would receive114
a monetary bonus if it employed DBE's. According to
contract specifications, Mountain Gravel solicited bids
from subcontractors to install guardrails along the high-
way.Adarand Constructors, Inc., a company that special-
ized in guardrails, submitted the lowest bid. However,
Mountain Gravel took advantage of its option to receive
a $10,000 bonus on its $1 Million contract by awarding
the subcontract to another bidder, Gonzales
Construction Company. 0 Logically, Gonzales, a Hispanic
company, was certified as a DBE while Adarand, a non-
minority owned firm was not.116
Adarand Construction brought suit against the
Secretary of Transportation alleging that the SCC pro-
gram violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as
race and gender were being considered as factors in
awarding federal contracts in Colorado, without any find-
ings of past discrimination in the state.11
7
The District Court for the District of Colorado grant-
ed summary judgment in favor of the Federal
Government. On appeal this judgment was affirmed by
the Tenth Circuit." 9 The Supreme Court Granted certio-
rari in order to revisit the question of what level of equal
protection scrutiny should apply to benign race based
classifications authorized by Congress.
In a 5-4 decision the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the district courts judgment. 12 Writing for the
majority Justice O'Connor, accompanied by Justices
Rehnquist and Kennedy who joined the entire opinion,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, who joined most of the
113 115 S.Ct .at 2102 (1995).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2097.
117 Id. at 2014.
118 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 ESupp.
240,245 (D. Colo. 1992).
119 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 16 E3d 1537,
1547 (10th Cir. 1994).
opinion, disposed of the issue of Adarand's standing to
bring suit, and turned to the central issue in the case;
Whether Congress has wider discretion than do states
and local governments to authorize race based affirma-
tive action programs? The majority considered the
Court's cumulative reasoning in Fullilove, Croson, and
Metro Broadcasting. The Court relied on Croson, when
it held that the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
burdened or benefited by a particular classification,1
and overruled Metro Broadcasting, in holding that all
programs containing racial classifications, whether creat-
ed by federal, state, or local government were to be sub-
ject to a single standard of review, strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. Essentially, the Court
expanded it's holding in Croson to include benign race
conscious federal actions. The Court remanded the case
for determination of whether the legislation at issue was
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government
interest.
Although Adarand imposed a stricter standard for
all race preference policies, several Justices noted that
there may be instances where a policy will survive this124
rigorous test. Specifically, Justice O'Connor made it
clear that the Court's decision did not signal the end of
affirmative action, "The unhappy persistence of both the
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this Country is an unfortunate
reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it... When race based action is necessary to
further a compelling government interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the narrow
tailoring test that the Court has set out in previous
1125
cases."
Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justice Kennedy, justified the majority opinion's devia-
tion from the doctrine of stare decisis. The plurality
attacked the decision in Metro Broadcasting as,"creating
an indefensible deviation from the tenets of equal pro-
tection, and also differentiating racial classifications
1127between state and federal action." Thus, the plurality
characterized Metro Broadcasting as a misapplication,
and proceeded to apply the principle that all racial clas-
sifications were subject to strict scrutiny.""
120 Id. at 2102.
121 Id. at 2104.
122 Croson 448 U.S. at 494.
123 114 S.Ct. at 2113.
124 Id. at 2117.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2114
127 Id. at 2115
128 Id. at 2117.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens criticized virtually the
entire majority opinion.29 First, he criticized the majori-
ty for its supposed inability to differentiate between
invidious and benign discrimination. "0 Second, he criti-
cized the majority for refusing to recognize a signifi-
cance between affirmative action legislation by the fed-
131
eral government, and the state and local governments.
Addressing the issue of stare decisis, Stevens argued that
the majority's decision was a departure from the prece-
dent set in Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, upholding
federal affirmative action programs in deference to
Congress, rather than a return to precedent. 1" Justice
Souter agreed that the Court's prior decision in Fullilove
applied, and noted that the majority failed to contest the
factual findings of discrimination in the construction
industry upon which Fullilove was based. Therefore,
according to Justice Souter stare decisis required the
Court to uphold the programs at issue.1
33
Justice Ginsberg stated in her dissent that the major-
ity's reason for strict scrutiny of all racial classifications
was to, "ferret out classifications in reality malign, but
masquerading as benign," 13 and thus strict scrutiny
should not necessarily be fatal to legitimate affirmative
action programs."' Thus, while she agreed with Steven's
argument of according deference to Congress and the
precedential value of Fullilove, she optimistically viewed
the Court's opinion as, "one that allows our precedent to
evolve, still to be informed by and responsive to chang-
1136ing conditions." Finally, Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and
Breyer disagreed with the determination that strict
scrutiny is not, "strict in theory, fatal in fact."
137
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND HIGHER EDUCATION
Although Adarand specifically tried to dispel the
notion that,"strict scrutiny in theory does not mean fatal
in fact,"138 the national trend against race-based prefer-
ence policies may result in the Equal Protection Clause
becoming a barrier to diversification. Recently, two fed-
eral courts struck down state racially-based post-sec-
ondary education programs tied to the admissions'39
process. These holdings are representative of the con-
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are beginning to lean. In both of these cases, federal
courts considered the issue of whether race- based pref-
erence programs that are part of educational admissions
policies violated the Equal Protection Clause. In each
case the court applied strict scrutiny.
A. Podbersky v. Kirwan
140
In Podbersky v. Kirwan, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a race-
based scholarship program, which was connected to the
University of Maryland admissions program violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Daniel Podbersky, a twenty-two
year old Hispanic student with a superior high school
grade point average, applied for a Benjamin Banneker
Scholarship offered at the University of Maryland which
was available to African-American students.' Although
Podbersky's academic credentials far exceeded the mini-
mum requirements, he was unable to compete for the
scholarship because he was not African-American. The
University of Maryland had adopted the scholarship to
counter the black and white segregation that prevalent in142
the school system. On finding that he was forbidden
from competing for the scholarship, Podbersky filed suit
against the University of Maryland, alleging that the uni-
versity had violated the Equal Protection Clause by deny-
ing him the opportunity to compete for the scholarship.
Podbersky sought injunctive and compensatory relief,
claiming that the University's program violated Title VI
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.
The trial court found that the race-based program
triggered strict scrutiny and would be assessed 
as such. 144
It would uphold the University's program only if they
could demonstrate that the program was narrowly tai-
lored to achieve compelling government interest in
accordance with Croson.
Accordingly, the University would have to prove pre-
sent effects of past discrimination in order to justify the
selectivity of the scholarship. 14 The court granted sum-
mary judgment for the University of Maryland and
Podbersky appealed.146
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court had cor-
rectly found that scholarship program should be exam-
139See Podbersky v. Kirwan, 38 E3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).;
Hopwood v. Texas, 861 E Supp. 551 (W.D.Tex. 1994).
14956 E2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
141 d. at 54-55.
142
id.143See Podbersky v. Kirwan, 764 ESupp. 364, 366 (D.Md.
1991).




ined under the Equal Protection Clause.'4 7 However, the
court held in applying the strict scrutiny test, that the
lower court erred in granting summary judgment, since
that remedy did not permit the court to find that there.... 148
were still present effects of past discrimination. The
court reversed and remanded.
149
On remand the district court found that the
University of Maryland's program was justifiable given
the sufficient evidence of present effects of past discrim-
ination and the fact that the program was narrowly tai-
lored."O Podbersky again appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
The court again applied strict scrutiny to the schol-
arship program. This time the court found no com-
pelling government interest to justify the program since
they determined there were no present effects of past dis-
crimination, rejecting the University of Maryland's claim
that a poor reputation in the African American communi-
ty and a racially hostile environment on campus were suf-
ficient to justify the scholarship program.The court held
that "mere knowledge of historical acts is not the kind of
present effect that can justify a race exclusive remedy.""'
The court acknowledged the findings of past discrimina-
tion, but determined that they did not establish any pre-
sent effects of past discrimination. Finally, the Court con-
cluded that there was indeed evidence that the scholar-
ship violated the Equal Protection Clause."' The Fourth
Circuit reversed and remanded for judgment in favor of
Podbersky. Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to
review this case, letting stand the Fourth Circuit's opinion
which invalidated the scholarship program.154
B. Hopwood v. Texas
In August, 1994, a United States district court in
Hopwood v. Texas,"' considered whether the University
of Texas School of Law's 1992 diversity admissions poli-
cy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment and Title VI. This case began when four
white law school applicants sued the University of Texas
Law School, claiming that they had been denied admis-
sion while African-Americans and Mexican-Americans
with lower grade point averages and LSAT scores, had
been offered admission. In 1992, the year that the
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admissions committee for minorities and a separate com-
mittee for non-minority applicants.'5 7 Consequently,
when reviewing a particular file, a member of the minor-
ity committee could not consider a particular minority
application against the non- minority applicants. 158 The
admissions committee also set distinct numerical cut-offs
for African-Americans, Mexican Americans, and others.159
The University of Texas advanced several rationales
for its affirmative action program, including promoting
diversity, providing opportunities for the largest minori-
ty groups in Texas, and remedyin& past discrimination
through the educational system. The district court
agreed that diversity and remedying past discrimination
were compelling interests. However, relying on Justice
Powell's decision in Bakke, the court held that the law
schools use of a separate committee failed to pass con-
stitutional muster because it was not narrowly tailored to
meet the goals of diversity and reversing discrimina-161
tion. Ultimately, the court held that the policy violated
the 14th Amendment because it failed to afford each indi-
vidual applicant a comparison with the entire pool of
applicants.
162
The court acknowledged the imperative goal of
diversity in the educational environment. Further, the
court agreed with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke that
race or ethnicity could be considered a plus factor in a
school's consideration of a particular applicant.
16
,
However, University's dual admission policy insulated
applicants from review against each other, a process
which the Bakke Court found unacceptable. A school
that does not permit a comparison between minority and
non-minority applicants unfairly favors one group over
another. 
161
Although the court ruled unconstitutional the dual
admissions policy in Hopwood, it also just as important-
ly recognized the value that the Supreme Court placed
on diversity. Under Hopwood, admissions committees
may consider race as a factor that is weighted against the
characteristics that non-minority applicants posses. In
fact, the court held that with the exception of separately
reviewing minority candidates, the admissions commit-
tees treated applicants similarly. The court suggested that
it would have upheld the admissions policy absent the• 166
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of the pronouncement made by the Court over 40 years
ago in Brown, "separate but equal is inherently
unequal."167
V CONCLUSION
On July 1, 1996 the Supreme Court denied a petition
for writ of certiorari. Surprisingly, along with the denial
of certiorari an opinion explaining the denial was also
issued. Justice Ginsburg, accompanied by Justice
Souter impressed, "[t] he importance of the issue of the
constitutionality of a public college or graduate school
using race or national origin as a factor in its admissions
1169process is a matter of great national importance."
However, the University of Texas was no longer chal-
lenging the lower court's judgment that the admissions
procedure was unconstitutional.17 Instead, petitioners
challenged the rationale relied on by the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly Justice Ginsberg stated, "we must
await a final judgment on a program genuinely in con-
troversy before addressing the important issue raised in
11•71
this petition.'
This rare explanation of the denial of certiorari may
be indicative of the fact that the Supreme Court realizes
the excessive importance of this particular issue, and
does not want the denial to be read as a lack of concern
I'7d. at 495.
'iTexas v. Hopwood, 116 S.Ct 2581 (1996).
on the part of the Court. It seems it is also almost an invi-
tation to revisit this issue. The Court apparently would
have preferred to rule on the issue. However the peti-
tioner vacated the constitutionality problem of the
admissions policy, having discontinued the policy, and
challenged an issue that the Court was unable to review.
Based on current trends, as plaintiffs continue to
challenge higher education admissions policies, review-
ing courts will most likely apply a strict scrutiny test con-
servatively. As affirmative action in higher education
stands today, the Supreme Court has indicated the level
of magnitude that this issue warrants, and hypothetically,
it is still possible to construct a diversified admissions
policy that will withstand strict scrutiny muster.
As we await an opportunity for the Supreme Court
to hear another affirmative action case one of the only
things that appears certain is that strict scrutiny is the
standard to be applied. However, the Court has applied
various gradients of strict scrutiny leaving no clear stan-
dards or guidelines that must be met. It is crystal clear
however, that the ability to construct a constitutionally
acceptable affirmative action admissions program has
become increasingly difficult and controversial.
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